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Abstract
This paper investigates the importance of ¯rm heterogeneity for our under-
standing of the aggregate volume of cross-country multinational sales. Recent
theoretical literature points out a sorting out ¯rms with respect to their inter-
nationalization strategy according to their productivity. Using the ¯rm level
data from German ¯rms' activities, we ¯nd a strong e®ect of ¯rms' size on
internationalization pattern. Moreover, we show that most of variation of the
aggregate volume of multinational sales is due to variation in the number of
¯rms participating in the market.
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maining errors.1 Introduction
Recent empirical papers have documented huge heterogeneity among ¯rms
within industries. Firms which di®er in productivity and size show pronounced
di®erences in their engagement in international trade. Bernard and Jensen
(1995, 1999a, 1999b), Bernard, et al. (2005), Clerides, et al. 1998, and Eaton
et al. (2005) showed that the bulk of international trade tends to be conducted
by a small number of exporters. Research on ¯rm heterogeneity and ¯rms' in-
ternational activities has mainly focused on international trade, although few
contributions have also considered activities of multinational ¯rms. In an ex-
tension of the trade literature, Helpman, et al. (2004), Girma, et al. (2004),
Head and Ries (2003) analyzed multinational ¯rms. They show that the proba-
bility that a ¯rm serves foreign market through a±liates' production increases
with its productivity. Theoretical and empirical results point to a sorting of
¯rms with respect to their internationalization strategy. The most productive
¯rms engage in production abroad while the least e±cient ¯rms operate only
in the domestic market. Firms with intermediate level of productivity produce
at home and serve the foreign market through exports.
There are however almost no systematic studies on the characteristics of multi-
national ¯rms' activities. Yeaple (2005) reports evidence from US multina-
tional manufacturers. He uses a con¯dential survey on multinational manu-
facturing ¯rms from the United States in 1994. His empirical ¯ndings are in
line with the theoretical prediction of Helpman, Melitz, and Yeaple (2004).
Helpman, Melitz, and Yeaple's theoretical model incorporates heterogeneous
¯rms into a general equilibrium framework. The model allows to examine the
huge heterogeneity found in ¯rm-level data. We therefore use a slightly sim-
pli¯ed version of this framework in our theoretical analysis.
2We derive four propositions from this theoretical model. They are particulary
linked with the sorting of ¯rms with respect to their productivity. In addi-
tion, we explore the e®ect of changes in market size and/or trade costs on
the activities of multinational ¯rms. Firms might react to exogenous changes
through entry and exit (extensive margin) or through the adjustment of sales
of existing ¯rms (intensive margin). We then test the predictions using ¯rm-
level data on German multinational activities in 2002. The database includes
information on all German parent and their foreign a±liates in more than 200
countries. We ¯nd strong support for all four propositions.
The rest of the paper is organized as follow. In section 2, we present descrip-
tive ¯rm-level statistics of German ¯rms' foreign a±liates. In section 3, we
derive the propositions from a model with heterogenous ¯rms. We test these
propositions in section 4. We conclude in section 5.
2 Descriptive Statistics
2.1 Data
This paper exploits a con¯dential ¯rm-level database which provide informa-
tion on German multinational activities. The MIDI (MIcro data base Direct
Investment) dataset of the Deutsche Bundesbank provides a detailed break-
down of the foreign assets and liabilities of German multinational ¯rms abroad
(Lipponer, 2006). German foreign direct investment is de¯ned as the direct or
indirect ownership or control by a single German entity of at least ten percent
of the voting securities of an incorporated foreign ¯rm or the equivalent inter-
est in an unincorporated foreign ¯rm. The database comprise information on
all foreign a±liates of German multinational ¯rms.
3The comprehensive database holds the balance sheets data of German foreign
a±liates, including their sales, employment and total assets in each of over
200 country destinations. It also includes information on the sector of activity
of parent ¯rm and a±liate at NACE rev-1 two-digit level. The data covers
foreign a±liates activities between 1989 and 2002. However, information for
the parent company is only available for 2002.
Some multinational ¯rms own more than one a±liate in a particular sector
of a particular country. To come closer to theory which models single-a±liate
¯rms and make activities of many-a±liates parents more comparable to single-
a±liates parents, we aggregate the a±liate level data sales and employment
for each (i) parent company, (ii) sector, (iii) country and (iv) year but keep
the information about the number of a±liates of each parent ¯rm.
2.2 Size and International Activities
The database includes 6,178 German parent ¯rms with total sales in Germany
of 1,150 Billion Euro in 2002. The sample counts 1,748 parent ¯rms in man-
ufacturing with sales in Germany of 954 Billion Euro. While only 0.21% of
all German ¯rms are multinational ¯rms, they account for about 27% of total
sales in Germany. Multinational ¯rms are large ¯rms, at least on average.
One might expect a priori little heterogeneity within the group of multinational
¯rms because multinational ¯rms are not randomly drawn from a distribution
of all ¯rms. Instead, ¯rms select themselves into this group. Thus the within
group heterogeneity might be expected to be small. However, as shown in
Figure 1, we ¯nd huge heterogeneity within the group of multinational ¯rms.
German multinational ¯rms' distribution is right skewed. While it is often
argued in the literature that large ¯rm are Pareto distributed, the shape shown
4in Figure 1 shows that the distribution is not too far from log-normal. From
this very crude inspection, the distribution of German multinational ¯rms does
not di®er from other ¯rm size distributions (Sutton 1997, Cabral and Mata
2003).














Source: MIDI, authors' computation.
Table 1 contains information about German parent ¯rms. We report informa-
tion on the number of German parent ¯rms, the number of foreign a±liates,
the volume of German multinational sales and their employees abroad accord-
ing to the size distribution of German parent ¯rms. We measure this size by
their total assets in 2002. Table 1 shows a high concentration of foreign af-
¯liates' activities on few parent ¯rms. Large German multinationals own on
average relatively more and larger a±liates. They employ more labor and have
higher sales.
In 2002, the largest German multinational parent ¯rms, which represent 1%
of the total number of German parents, owns 10% of the number of foreign af-
¯liates. They account for 29.3% of total German multinationals' foreign sales
5Table 1
Quantile of German Parent Companies' Total Assets (2002, percent of the total into
parentheses)




1 1454 1980 6.75E+07 334151
(23.5) (8.8) (4.6) (7.0)
2 1352 2282 4.10E+07 267023
(21.9) (10.1) (2.8) (5.6)
3 981 2188 4.15E+07 220928
(15.9) (9.7) (2.8) (4.7)
4 739 2313 5.19E+07 282535
(12.0) (10.2) (3.5) (6.0)
5 605 2307 6.59E+07 373929
(9.8) (10.2) (4.5) (7.9)
6 382 2335 8.20E+07 348786
(6.2) (10.3) (5.6) (7.3)
7 315 2302 1.41E+08 501531
(5.1) (10.2) (9.6) (10.7)
8 201 2337 2.51E+08 770814
(3.3) (10.3) (17.1) (16.2)
9 87 2290 2.99E+08 805698
(1.4) (10.1) (20.3) (17.0)
10 62 2262 4.31E+08 845493
(1.0) (10.0) (29.3) (17.8)
Total 6178 22596 1.47E+09 4750888
Source: MIDI (2002), authors' computation.
abroad, and make up for 17.8% of German multinationals' foreign employ-
ment. Table 1 shows moreover that most of German multinational ¯rms are of
smaller size. The three ¯rst deciles comprise almost 2/3 of the total number of
parent ¯rms. These ¯rms account for only 10% of total German multinational
sales abroad and 17.3% of German multinationals' foreign employment. The
62 largest German parent ¯rms own on average 36 a±liates. This is much
more than the average 1.4 a±liates which are hold by parent ¯rms in the
¯rst decile. Table 1 shows that the larger the German ¯rms, the more foreign
a±liates they own.
In 2002, about 62% of the total number of German multinational parent ¯rms
6own a±liates in exactly one market. The share of the parent ¯rms that own
a±liates in two to nine countries amounts about 34%. About 4% for the par-
ents ¯rms that invest in more than 10 markets. Thus, German multinational
¯rms are also heterogenous with respect to their degree of internationaliza-
tion as shown in Figure 2. We illustrate the degree of internationalization of
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Fig. 2. Market per Firms, 2002
Each panel of Figure 2 represents the frequency with which ¯rms are active
in di®erent markets. This frequency decreases. Most ¯rms concentrate their
foreign activities in one market while only a few are global players.
About 20% of the total number of German parent ¯rms own a±liates in
France, which is a large and close-by market. The literature using gravity
equation states that the number of a±liates in a foreign market increases in
the size of this market and decreases in bilateral distance. We show this re-
lationships in Figure 3. We present in panel (a) the correlation between the
number of ¯rms weighted by their market share in a particular market and
the size of this market. We illustrate in panel (b) the correlation between
the number of a±liates weighted by the market size against distance from
Germany.
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We show in panel (a) a positive correlation between the number of ¯rms
weighted by their market share in a particular market and the size of this mar-
ket. Their results can thus be generalized to multinational ¯rms. The number
of German ¯rms normalized by German market share increases systematically
with market size, but with an elasticity less than one. Panel (b) shows a neg-
ative correlation between the number of a±liates weighted by the market size
and distance from Germany. The picture looks very similar to Eaton et al.
(2005) results in their study on French exporters.
3 Firm Heterogeneity in a Proximity-Concentration Model
Productivity di®erences are the most likely candidate causing this huge het-
erogeneity within the group of multinational ¯rms. Helpman et al. (2004) were
¯rst to incorporate productivity di®erences in a model of multinational ¯rms.
In their model, each ¯rm has a speci¯c level of productivity that the ¯rm
draws at entry from a common distribution. In our theoretical part, we follow
the notation of Helpman et al. and de¯ne the productivity level as 1=ak where
ak denotes the marginal cost of production of a ¯rm k. Market structure is
monopolistic competitive. Pro¯t maximization leads therefore to a price that
is a ¯xed markup over marginal cost. Thus, a ¯rm k sets its ¯rm-speci¯c pro-
8ducer price to pk = ak=½, where ½ is the degree of di®erentiation between
products. ½ is assumed to be equal for all ¯rms. Equation (1) described the







where ¾ = 1=(1 ¡ ½). Pij denotes the price index in sector i of country j. Yij
denotes total demand in sector i of country j. ph
kj is the price of ¯rm k selling
in market j. The superscript h, h = Ex;MNE, indicates respectively whether
a ¯rm is an exporter or produces abroad. A ¯rm can choose between both
channel. Consumer prices of good k that is exported from a ¯rm in another
country l, pEx
kj include bilateral iceberg trade costs, ¿lj, between the home
country l and sales market j. Because the same wage prevails in all countries
and labor is the only factor of production, ¯rms produce abroad at the same
marginal costs as at home. Hence, the prices of good k produced abroad are
the same as in the home country. Thus, ¯rm k's good's price in country j are
higher if the ¯rms exports it goods from l than if ¯rm k produces in country
j. The decision between exporting and producing abroad depends therefore on
the distance costs between j and l. Yet, the decision depends also on ¯rm's
productivity level 1=ak. Substitute the price in equation (1), to see that more
productive ¯rms have higher sales in the foreign market.
Proposition 1: A more productive ¯rm owns a foreign a±liate that has larger
sales.
Each ¯rm compares the pro¯t related to each mode of entry in market j.
The ¯rms that have a higher productivity level than 1=aEx
j are active in this
market and earn positive pro¯t. Firms that have a productivity level equal
to 1=aMNE
j are indi®erent between exporting and producing abroad because
both strategies yield the same pro¯t. Firms with a productivity level higher
9than 1=aMNE
j produce in country j and have higher pro¯ts than ¯rms with
a lower productivity level that export to j. We use the zero-pro¯t conditions
to derive the critical marginal cost levels (a) for a ¯rm that produces only for
the home market (b) for an exporting ¯rm and (c) for a ¯rm that produces
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We de¯ne A =
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ij ½1¡¾ and insert (2b) in (2c). Rearranging terms yields





















To see this, note that the left hand side must be non-negative, because it
expresses the pro¯ts of the multinational ¯rm. Pro¯ts cannot be negative
because we assume free exit. Thus, the right-hand side must be non-negative
as well which requires aMNE
ij · aEx
ij .
Proposition 2: (a) a ¯rm from country l that exports to country j is less
productive than a ¯rm from country l that produces in country j, (b) country
j sales of an exporter from country l are smaller than country j sales of an
a±liate from a l- based multinational ¯rm that produces in country j.
Proposition 2 deals with di®erences between exporters and multinational ¯rms
from the same home country which are active in the same host country. Next
we turn to the decision of one particular ¯rm concerning its optimal strategy
for di®erent host countries. If ¯xed costs fMNE
ij and fEx
ij in (2) di®er between
countries, the decision of ¯rm k di®ers between countries. Yet, more productive
10¯rms are more likely to establish a foreign a±liate in any country. Thus,
adding up the foreign a±liates of ¯rm k over all countries, we have that more
productive ¯rms are likely to produce in more foreign countries.
Proposition 3: A more productive ¯rm owns a larger number of foreign af-
¯liates.
From the critical marginal cost levels given in equations (2), we can also derive
the e®ect of country characteristics on the internalization decision of ¯rms. All
else equal, a larger foreign market Yij increases the minimum marginal cost
levels of exporters and ¯rms producing abroad. Thus, they are more ¯rms
active in a larger foreign country. Trade costs reduce the critical marginal cost
level of exporters. Thus, less ¯rms are active in countries further away. If ¯xed
costs are independent of trade costs, trade costs reduce the critical marginal
cost level of a multinational ¯rm. Among the ¯rms from country l active in a
foreign country j, the share of multinational ¯rms increase with trade costs.
Proposition 4: The number of ¯rms that are active in a foreign country j
increases in the foreign country market size and decreases with bilateral trade
costs between l and j.
4 Empirical Results
4.1 Size
In this section, we test each of the proposition using information on manufac-
turing German parent ¯rms. The sample includes information on 1,748 parent
¯rms classi¯ed in manufacturing and their 6,930 foreign a±liates in 2002.
Our test strategy is based on the theoretical model which establishes a direct
link between productivity and the size of the parent ¯rm. We therefore use the
11size of the parent as measure of productivity. We know that productivity is
not the only determinant of size. Yet, we are con¯dent that the size of a ¯rm is
a good proxy for productivity even in a world where ¯rms are not symmetric
with respect to consumer preferences and vertical di®erentiation also exists.
We rely on size because we can not estimate ¯rm-level productivity since we
lack data on value added.
Proposition 1 states that more productive, i.e. larger, ¯rms own foreign a±l-
iates that have larger sales in a foreign country. The empirical test of propo-
sition 1 is thus straight forward. We regress the logarithm of the size of the
foreign a±liate on the logarithm of the size of the parent ¯rm. We add country
¯xed e®ects and two set of sector dummy variables related to the sector of the
a±liate, Da
i , and to the sector of the parent ¯rm, D
p
i. We control for the fact
that a parent ¯rm can own several a±liates by clustering the standard errors
around the parent ¯rm identity. Given country and sector ¯xed e®ects, we
expect a positive impact of the size of the parent ¯rm on the a±liate size.
ln(size a±liatekij) = 4.873 + 0.184 ln(parent sizek) + Da
i + D
p
i + Dj + ukij
(7.18) (12.66)
The R2 is 0.28. The variation of the parent ¯rm size and the ¯xed e®ects
explain thus 28% of the variation of the foreign a±liate size. The parent ¯rm
size has a positive and signi¯cant impact on the size of the foreign a±liate.
Turning to proposition 2, it states that a ¯rm that exports is less productive
(i.e. smaller at home) and has smaller sales in country j than a ¯rm that pro-
duce in country j. To test this proposition we must ¯rst distinguish between
exporting ¯rms and ¯rms producing aborad. We do this by using the sector
classi¯cation of ¯rms and a±liates. In the data, a±liates and parent ¯rms
are classi¯ed according to the sector they are engaged in. For our analysis,
we de¯ne a parent ¯rm classi¯ed in manufacturing that has a±liates active
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Source: MIDI, authors' computation.
only in the wholesale sector of a particular country as an exporting ¯rm. We
de¯ne a manufacturing parent ¯rm which holds a±liates that are active in
manufacturing as ¯rm producing abroad. Thus, although we do not have in-
formation about exports at the ¯rm level we can distinguish between exporters
and ¯rms producing abroad. Unfortunately, many ¯rms own both wholesale
a±liates and a±liates in manufacturing, although not necessarily in the same
country. We therefore restrain from testing proposition 2a and continue with
2b which states that a±liates in wholesale have smaller sales than a±liates in
manufacturing.
Having classi¯ed the ¯rms in those which export and those which produce
abroad, we ¯rst look at the cumulative distribution of the foreign a±liates
in wholesale, W, and in manufacturing, M. They are shown in Figure (4).
The graph points to a ¯rst-order stochastic dominance of manufacturing a±l-
iates with respect to sales. Manufacturing a±liates are larger than wholesale
a±liates over the whole distribution.
13Next, we analyze systematic di®erences between both distribution using the
non-parametric Kolmogorov-Smirnov test (KS-test). The two-sided KS-test
has the advantage of making no assumption about the distribution of data. It
determines whether two distributions di®er signi¯cantly. Therefore it calculate
the largest di®erence between the observed and expected cumulative frequen-
cies, which is called D-statistics. This statistics is compared against the critical
D-statistic for that sample size. The results of the two-sided KS-test is shown
in Table 2. The second line of Table 2 test the hypothesis that a±liates in man-
ufacturing have smaller sales than those in wholesales. The largest di®erence
between the distributions functions is 0.069 which is statistically signi¯cant
at 1%. Thus, the null hypothesis that a±liates in manufacturing are smaller
is rejected. The third line test the hypothesis that manufacturing contains
larger values than wholesales. The largest di®erence between the distributions
functions is -0.0275 which is not signi¯cant.
Table 2
KS Test of Di®erences between manufacturing a±liates and wholesale a±liates
Group Largest Di®erence P-value Corrected
Ho: M ¡ W · 0 0.0696 0.000
Ho: W ¡ M · 0 -0.0275 0.157
Combined K-S-Test 0.0696 0.000 0.000
Source: MIDI (2002), authors' computation.
From the two-sided test of Table 2, we clearly reject the hypothesis that manu-
facturing and wholesale a±liates have equal size distribution. We cannot reject
the stochastic dominance of manufacturing size distribution over wholesale size
distribution. However, we can reject the stochastic dominance of wholesale size
distribution over manufacturing size distribution.
144.2 Intensive and Extensive Margins
A new feature of the proximity-concentration model with heterogenous ¯rms is
that not only the number of foreign a±liates (extensive margin) but also their
average sales (intensive margin) adjust to changes in market size or trade costs.
In our multi-unit ¯rm framework, there exist two extensive margins. First, a
new ¯rm might enter a foreign market and become a multinational. Second,
a multinational ¯rm might set up a new a±liate in a country which it served
through exports before.
Proposition 3 refers to the second extensive margin. It states that a more
productive ¯rm owns a larger number of foreign a±liates. In order to test
this proposition, we regress the number of foreign a±liates on the size of the
parent ¯rm from the manufacturing sector and add a set of parent ¯rm's sector
speci¯c e®ects. We estimate a negative binomial regression model since we ¯nd
overdispersion in the data. When there is overdispersion the poisson estimates
are ine±cient with standard errors biased downward yielding spuriously large
z-values. We control for the fact that a parent ¯rm can own several a±liates
by clustering the standard errors around the parent ¯rm identity. Given sector
¯xed e®ects, we expect a positive impact of the size of the parent ¯rm on the
number of foreign a±liates.




The Cragg and Ulher's R2 is 0.17 meaning that the variation of the parent
¯rm size and the ¯xed e®ects explain about 17% of the variation of the number
of foreign a±liates. Computing the marginal e®ects of the parent size on the
number of foreign a±liates, we ¯nd that a one percent increase in the size of
the parent ¯rm, increases the number of foreign a±liate by 0.54%. The size of
the parent ¯rm has a positive and signi¯cant impact on the number of foreign
15a±liates. We interpret this as positive e®ect of productivity of the parent ¯rm
on the number of its foreign a±liates.
In order to analyze more precisely the respective importance of the exten-
sive and intensive margins, we conduct a simple regression analysis similar to
Eaton et al. (2005) and Yeaple (2005). We use a gravity equation to decom-
pose changes in market size and trade costs into the extensive and intensive
margins. The gravity equation states that host country's market size has a
positive e®ect on the volume of a±liates' sales while geographic, regulatory
and cultural transaction costs between countries have a negative e®ect (Klein-
ert and Toubal, 2005). The di®erent transaction costs can be summarized by
the market share of foreign a±liates of German multinational ¯rms in country
j, ¸jl. This share is calculated as the share of German a±liates' sales Sjl in
total sales in country j Xj. Yet, total sales of German ¯rms' foreign a±liates
in country j Sjl can also be decomposed in the number of German ¯rms' for-
eign a±liates Njl and the average size of a German foreign a±liate in country
j ¹ sjl. Thus, sales of all German multinational a±liates in market j, Sjl can be
expressed as:
Sjl = Njl ¹ sjl = ¸jlXj (4)
Total sales in country j Xj equals country's j absorption de¯ned as gross
production plus import minus export. We regress the logarithm of Njl ´
Sjl=¹ sjl on the logarithm of German ¯rms' market share in country j and the
logarithm of absorption Xj in country j to show how much of the variation
in German multinationals' sales is due to variation in the market share of
German a±liates and how much to variation in market size of country j. To
explore the possibility that aggregate sample masks e®ects of sectoral variation
of multinational sales across countries, we conduct this decomposition using
a full set of country speci¯c dummy variables.
16Table 3
Intensive and Extensive Margin, (2002)
Label Manufacturing Wholesale
A±liates A±liates
German Market Share ¸jl 0.64¤¤¤ 0.63¤¤¤
(0.04) (0.04)




Nb. Obs. 721 685
R2 90.62 86.50
Robust standard errors into parentheses. Standard errors have been adjusted
for clustering around the country's identity.
¤¤¤ denotes statistical signi¯cance at one percent level.
Table (3) shows two di®erent speci¯cations corresponding to activities of for-
eign a±liates. We interpret the coe±cient estimates in the manufacturing
sectors as follow: given country's market size, a higher German multinational
market share is due to a 64% increase in the number of a±liates and a 36%
increase in the average sales per a±liate. Further, given the market share of
German multinational ¯rms, a larger market re°ects 66% more a±liate and
34% more sale per ¯rms. These results are in line with the results found by
Yeaple (2005) for foreign a±liates of US manufacturing ¯rms. Much of the
variation of German multinational sales across countries is due to variation in
the number of ¯rms participating in the market.
The estimated parameters for a±liate in manufacturing are lower as the pa-
rameters in Eaton et al. (2005) who analyze international trade of French
¯rms. That should be expected if ¯xed costs of production abroad are higher
than ¯xed costs of exporting. We therefore also estimated the adjustment of
wholesale a±liate of German multinational ¯rms. Surprisingly, their adjust-
ment to changes in market size and the German market share does not di®er
signi¯cantly from those of manufacturing a±liates of German multinational
¯rms. Given country's market size, a higher German multinational market
17share is due to a 63% increase in the number of a±liates and a 37% increase
in the average sales per a±liate. Further, given the market share of German
multinational ¯rms, a larger market re°ects 63% more a±liate and 37% more
sale per ¯rms. The adjustment through the extensive margin is lower as Eaton
et al.'s estimates for France. We believe that the di®erence in the results stems
from our smaller sample of exporters which is biased towards larger ¯rms. In
sum, our results show that adjustment through the extensive margin in our
sample is almost twice as large as adjustment through the intensive margin.
5 Conclusion
We examine ¯rm heterogeneity using information from a comprehensive dataset
on multinational activities. Therefore, we derive four propositions from a
proximity-concentration model with heterogenous ¯rms and test them. The
empirical analysis strongly supports all four theoretical predictions.
First, we show that larger ¯rms have larger a±liates. Second, exporters to
a particular country are less productive than ¯rms that produce in the this
country. The sales of an exporter in a particular country are smaller than
the sales of a multinational ¯rm's a±liate that produces there. Third, more
productive ¯rms own a larger number of foreign a±liates. The probability
of producing in a new country increases with productivity. Hence, the ad-
justment to changes of market size and/or trade costs through the extensive
margin is largely driven by a larger number of a±liates of existing multina-
tional ¯rms. Fourth, we conduct a deeper analysis of the respective importance
of the extensive and intensive margins. We show that the extensive margin is
twice as important as the intensive margin. This ¯nding supports model with
monopolistic competition among heterogenous ¯rms.
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